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Rewinding Rwanda: What If?
Eric Patterson
Vanguard University
A d eca d e ago, 800,000
individuals
were mercilessly
slaughtered
in Rwanda . During
last year's
ten- yea r
anniversary
of these horrific events, th ere appeared to be
unanimity
in the scholarly
communily
that •·We should
have done something ." What should have been done ? Or
better,
what could have been done differently ? This
article approaches
this issue cou11te1factually
by asking
who could have acted to halt the bloodshed and, if the y
had . what would it hav e taken to impose order and stop
the killing?
The analysis
suggests
that it is nearl y
impossible
to conceive
of an outside
intervention
occurring in the Rwanda case. and that it may have taken
n larg e occupying army with a nearly limitless mandate
to stop the killing . Mor eover, eve n robust intervention
would not have provided
the long-term
conditions
for
durable peace in th e Great lakes region .

A

decade ago, 800,000 individuals were mercilessly
slaughtered in Rwanda . Hundreds of thousands were
raped, disfigured, and expelled from their homes . Durin g
last year's ten-year anniversary of these horrific events, there
appea red to be unanimity among pundits and philosophers that
"We should have done something. " Indeed , editorial pages and
scholarly journals were replete with truisms such as "the world
stood by ... " "fai lure of the international community ... " and "abdicated our responsibility."
Author's Note : I would like to thank Monique G. Lopez for research assistance . I am
also grateful for the comments of Dennis McNutt , Dan Sabia, and the two anonymous
reviewers .
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What should have been done? Or better, what could have
been done differently? This article approaches this issue counterfactually. More specifically, the article addresses the questions:
Who could have acted to halt the bloodshed and, if they had,
what would it have taken to impose order and stop the killing?
The conclusions are sobering but not surprising. My analysis
suggests that it is nearly impossible to conceive of an outside
intervention occurring in the Rwanda case , and that it may have
taken a large occupying army with a nearly limitless mandate to
stop the killing. The reluctance of the international community to
intervene was then remains today the primary obstacle to
military humanitarian intervention.
THECOUNTERFACTUALAPPROACH

The primary question is "Had the international community
intervened in Rwanda, what would it have taken to stop the
killing?" Asking such a question is a counterfactual, that is, the
question asks for a specific outcome that is counter to the
historical record of facts. We use counterfactuals in daily life on
a regular basis: "I wonder what would have happened had I. .. "
"If they had only done such and such ... " " What if?"
Although counterfactuals are common in conversation, they
have a more controversial record in studies of history and social
science. Some purists argue that what we should be studying is
what actually happened, not hypotheticals about what might
have happened. Critics often refer to Blaise Pascal's famous observation, "Had Cleopatra's nose been shorter, the whole face of
the world would have been different." Of course, Pascal meant
that Cleopatra's incomparable beauty was directly linked to a
war that shaped the destiny of Rome, and thus all of Western
civilization. Detractors of counterfactual studies cite "C leo-
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patra's nose" as the best example of a genre best left to science
fiction. 1
Nonetheless, over the past decade the use of counterfactual
and modal arguments in history and the social sciences has increased.2 Bulhof ( 1999, 146) defines "counterfactua l condit ionals" as sentences that are of the form "if p then q" where p and q
are "any sentence which is either true or false .... A counterfactual
conditional is one in which the antecedent (the term following
the ' if') is in fact false, that is, it runs counter to the facts."
Tetlock and Belkin (1996, 4) argue "counterfactual reasoning is a
prerequisite for any form of learning from history." They assert
that in disciplines such as history and political science, it is
nearly impossible to test historical hypotheses through controlled
experiments. Thus, researchers must tum to counterfactuals m
order to test causal relationships among variables.
Numerous approaches to counterfactual reasoning have developed in recent years. For instance, Sylvan and Majeski (1998)
propose a system of modal logic and semantics based largely on
the work of Saul Kripke. Issues of modality are central to counterfactual research, because counterfactual logic is not simply
about changing a few historic conditions, but also seeks to understand how those changes would have resulted in other important changes over time. Johannes Bulhoff (1999, 145) agrees
1

Sec for instance Creary and Hill (1975), and Vessel (2003).
Today, the literature on counterfactuals is modest, but there are two primary volumes of
counterfactual scholarship . The first, Tetlock and Belkin (I 996), is a collection of political science papers that resulted from a conference sponsored by the Social Science
Research Council in 1995. The volume discusses controversial points in political history
such as " If the United States had not dropped atomic bombs on two Japanese cities in
August 1945, the Japanese would still have surrendered roughly when they did." The
second volume, Niall Ferguson's Vir/lJnl Histo,y, looks at a wider range of historical
examples, considering how Western history might have been different in a variety of
cases, from a victory for Charles I to the absence of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s.
2
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It has been long recognized that counterfactuals are
modal in character. They describe not just a possibility (it is possible, for example, that Germany could
have won the Second World War) but what follows ,
in some sense , from that possibility (if Germany had
won the war, NATO would never have been created).
If that possibility had been actual, then other facts
about the world would be different as well.

Why employ counterfactuals? There are several reasons to
utilize such a methodology. The first is for studies that want to
consider historical cause and effect. Scholars often presuppose
that x caused y, but want to speculate on the results had x been
somewhat different. Because we cannot rewind history, scholars
often resort to counterfactuals to examine their claims about
causality. A related issue for counterfactual study is that it is used
for explanation. Often historical events are linked, wittingly or
unwittingly, by scholars. Counterfactual reasoning helps scholars
disentangle complex events and explain specific variables within
a richer canvas. 3
Another value of counterfactual approaches is that they assist
scholars in considering critical junctures in history. Critica l
junctures are those events or moments when a past system is
transformed or abolished and a new system takes over. 4 Critica l
junctures include events such as the American Revolution and
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Counterfactuals can help us
understand the dynamics of the critical juncture and its
precedents. Furthermore, Bulhoff (I 999, 145) argues that
counterfactuals are useful when scholars make nom1ative

3

See Tucker ( 1999).
There is a diverse literature analyzing critical junctures . See for examples Cruz (2000),
Henning ( 1998), and Collier ( 1993).

4
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judgments about the "rightness" or "wrongness " of decisions by
elites. We evaluate how a decision, such as Hitler 's decision to
invade the Soviet Union, was wise or foolish, prudent or
imprudent, based on what followed in history. Such an approach
is actually counterfactual because we are assuming that history is
not deterministic - Hitler could have made an alternative choice
and that choice would have presumably resulted in different
outcomes.
In sum, counterfactuals are tools for analyzing causality,
considering relationships among variables, explaining historical
events, evaluating the influence of critical junctures, and making
judgments about "good" and "bad" policies and choices in
history. Consequently, counterfactuals are an appropriate
approach for dealing with a human catastrophe of epic
proportions-the Rwanda genocide.
THE

1994 RWANDA GENOClDE

The Treaty of Versailles (1919) transferred governance of
Rwanda-Urundi from Germar,y to Belgium . Under colonialism,
the Tutsi minority was allowed western-style education and
various social and economic privileges that were designed to
reinforce Belgian rule. The Hutu majority was oppressed within
this system of segregation. After considerable agitation and some
violence, the Hutu community experienced a breakthrough in
1960 with municipal election victories across the country. Soon
thereafter , Belgium withdrew from this region.
As the Hutu majority took increasing control of the country
over the next three decades, ethnic violence occurred intermit tently, including massacres by both sides. In 1990, under pressure from the international community, Rwandan President
Habyarimana allowed for the consideration of a multi-party democracy. However, fighting continued and it was not until 1993
that the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and HabyariYOL. 33 2005
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mana 's Hutu-dominated regime signed a peace accord. As part of
the peace document, the Arusha Accords, about 2,500 UN troops
(United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda-UNAMIR) were
placed in Kigali to supervise the security of the capital and guarantee peace. All the while, Hutu paramilitaries and militias
trained for an expected future confrontation. 5
On April 6, 1994, the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi,
Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntarymaria, were killed when
Habyarimana's plane was shot down. Within one hour of the
plane crash, the killings began. 6 Roadblocks were set up by the
Hutu-led Rwandan military and militias (interahamwe), and a
radical radio station called on the Hutu majority to eradicate the
Tutsi minority. Tutsis were systematically killed as forces went
door to door seeking their prey. Within the first day, thousands of
people were slaughtered , a number that grew steadily for the
next twelve weeks.
When the massacres began, there were 2,519 UNAMIR
troops in Rwanda. However, they had modest equipment and no
mandate to stop the slaughter. Ten Belgian soldiers were brutally
killed attempting to protect the moderate prime minister. Three
days after the plane crash, 1,000 French, Belgian, and Italian
troops arrived in Kigali to evacuate their nationals (Power, 2002,
353).
Although local UNAMIR commander General Romeo Dallaire called upon the UN to reinforce his modest force, on April
21 the international community voted to reduce the number of
international soldiers in Rwanda from 2,519 to 270. By this time
as many as a quarter of a million people had died. Meanwhile , in
5

PBS , "Frontline : Rwanda Chronology, " PBS online [home page on-line); available from
http ://www .pbs.org/wgbh /pages/frontline /s hows/rwand a/etc/cron .html ; Internet; accessed
28 August 2004.
6

ibid.
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Western countries government officials debated whether or not
the term "genocide" should be used to describe the atrocities occurring in Rwanda. Six weeks after the killings had begun, U.S.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher finally authorized his diplomats to use the term "genocide" (Power, 200 I, section VU).
On May 17, the Security Council mandated an arms embargo
and requested that UNAMIR expand to have 5,500 troops so that
action could take place. However, it took almost a full 6 months
for member states to send troops. 7 Two months into the genocide,
on June 14, France's President Mitterand stated that France
would intervene in Rwanda (Prunier, 1995, 282). On June 22, the
Security Council allowed French troops (Operation Turquoise) to
enter Rwanda and create a safety zone, which was largely useful
in protecting Hutu militants from the vengeance of the Tutsi-RPF
which had intervened and effectively stopped the genocide. The
French handed off to an expanded UNIMAR force in August. In
the end, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate
Hutus were killed in a period of l 00 days.
INTERVENT IO N IN RWANDA

A counterfactual is based on two simple principles. The first
is that something could have happened differently (e.g. Hitler not
invading Russia). The second principle of counterfactual inquiry
is modality-a "counterhistory" of events following the counterfactual would work out differently (e.g. Hitler establishes and
maintains the Third Reich across Europe). In the Rwanda case
the specific counterfactual is some outside power intervening
with enough force to stop the genocide and impose a minimal
environment of order in Rwanda. Thus, our investigation consid7

UN, "Rwanda-UNAMIR Background, " UN Online (home page on-line] ; available from
http ://www .un .org/Dept s/dpko/dpko/co_mission /unamirS .htm ; Internet ; acces sed 1 September 2004 .
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ers (1) who could have intervened and (2) upon intervention
what steps would have been necessary to impose order and stop
the killing.
It is well documented that ethnic tensions between the Hutus
and the Tutsis span centuries , thus the outbreak of violence in
1994 was only the latest internecine conflict. Obviously, there
were no institutional actors within Rwanda with either the wil l or
the capacity to stop the massacres. Consequently , the violence
would either have to die out of its own accord or be stamped out
by international actors . The former is what happened with
disastrous results. Thus it is to the latter we tum : If foreig n
military intervention to thwart or ameliorate the crisis had
occuned , which international actors had the capacity to act and
what would have motivated them to act?

The United States
In 1994, the United States possessed the world s most
powerful and sophisticated military . American prowess was
demonstrated in the 1991 Per sian Gulf War, and intervention on
behalf of the Kuwaiti people gave credence to then-President
Bu sh 's claim of a 'new world order." The American military
had , and continues to have, preeminent capability in deploy ing
land , air, and sea power to distant regions .
The question of intervention in Rwanda however is not one of
military power. Rather , it is one of political choices . Can we
imagine the U.S. government deciding to intervene in Rwanda in
April or May of 1994?
In January 1993, William Jefferson Clinton was sworn in as
President of the United States. Clinton immediately burnt bridges
to virtually the entire military establishment by moving to fulfill
his campaign promise of integrating homo sexual s into the armed
services. The resulting controversy , combined with his reputation
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as a Vietnam War protester, created an environment of tension
between the White House and the Pentagon.
Moreover, although the U.S. presided over the world's most
powerful military , there was a strong norm in Washington against
using the armed forces for anything other than national defense.
This position was articulated by then-chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, "The job of the U.S. military is to
fight and win the nation's wars" (Daalder, 1997, 41 ). Hence,
there was tremendous reluctance among military leaders, not to
mention the White House and Congress, toward using the
military instrument in cases that were not vital national interests.
Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole expressed this position on
April 10, "I don't think we have any national interest there"
(Power, 2002, 352).
Finally, U.S. attention was diverted elsewhere. Large
concentrations of troops were monitoring the no-fly zones in
Iraq, and by late 1993 the UN authorized the U.S. Navy to
enforce an embargo against Haiti's military junta. Witrun the
year U.S. troops entered Haiti to restore deposed President Jean
Bertrand Aristide to power. Moreover, the State Department was
focused on the multi-faceted bloodbath in the former Yugoslavia
and the apparent resolve of the UN, EU, and OSCE to do nothing
to stop it. Most importantly, President Clinton learned a lesson
during his first year in office about military humanitarian
intervention in Africa. In October 1993, the famous "Black
Hawk Down" incident occurred just 1;000 miles away from
Rwanda in Mogadishu, prompting an American withdrawal from
anarchic Somalia.
In sum, it hardly seems possible that the United States, in a
mid-term election year dominated by domestic issues; led by a
new Commander-in-Chief; diverted by Haiti, the Middle East,
and Bosnia; and reeling from the Somalia debacle , could have
mustered the political will to intervene in a far off country that
\ ' 01,.

33 2005

132

PATTERSON

few people, even in the State Department, could readily locate on
a map.

Europe and the United Nations
The EU had no military force of its own in 1994, relying on
NATO and individual national militaries for defense. Moreover,
Western Europe 's diplomatic corps was largely focused on
developing positive relationships with the unstable Russian
Federation in the aftermath of the Cold War.8 And most notably,
the eyes of all European capitals as well as the UN were
mesmerized by the incredibly complex and murderous conflict in
the Balkans and other minor conflicts in former Soviet republics.
For simplicity of analysis I have lumped Europe together with
the UN. EU countries such as France and Germany generally
rely on multi-lateral diplomacy and international institutions in
responding to international crises, and their decisions were
inextricably linked to UN policies during this time period. This
was true for both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the Yugoslav crisis,
the European countries relied largely on European Union and
United Nations diplomacy to halt the violence. In retrospect, we
know that from 1992 to 1994 European powers lacked the
resolve to forcefully stop the killing in Bosnia, even though UN
peacekeepers from European states were deployed to protect safe
havens such as Srebrenica.
With regard to Rwanda, major European and Atlantic voices
(Canada, France, and Belgium) consistently appealed to the UN
for decisions, and some were represented on the ground by small
detachments of troops involved in UNAMIR. For instance, Belgian had 440 troops involved in UNAMIR and an additional 800
stationed in Nairobi. France had 800 troops located in central
Africa (Melvern, 2000, 147). However, in his autobiographical
8

The Soviet Union had only ceased to exist at the end of 1991.
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account of the violence, UN AMIR commander Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire (2003, 208 -209) recalls that major European
players were "adamant" about not being "dragged back into
Rwanda":
.. .the political state of mind in the Security Council
regarding the future of the mission. The unequivocal
position of the United States was that if there was no
broad-based transitional government in the next very
short while, the whole mission should be pulled .
However, both the French and the Belgians were
adamant that they didn 't want to be dragged back
into Rwanda because the UN had left the place in a
state of potential catastrophe [emphasis added].

Some might suggest that had the United States lobbied the
Security Council, action might have taken place to halt the
Rwandan genocide. 9 However, the reality is that independent of
U.S. policy , European policy was hands-off toward Rwanda.
European words were few, but their actions were clear: on April
10, a thousand European military personnel landed to evacuate
their citizens (Power, 2002, 353). The same Europeans who were
9

Samantha Powers ' moving and angry work on Rwanda, " Bystanders to Genocide ," (The
Atlantic Monthly , September 2001 ), fonns the basis of her chapter on Rwanda in her later
best-seller, A Problem from Hell (2002) . Her work is well-known for its excoriating
account of the U.S. not wanting to engage the Rwanda genocide in early 1994. Her account seems incredibly reluctant to likewise blame the UN or the Europeans for inaction,
but she dv,.s report the many instances in which the UN and its European constituents
consciously neglected the gathering storm in Rwanda . For instance, she cites Dallaire 's
inability to get UN headquarters to provide him with money and materiel: "When Dallaire expressed concern, he was instructed by a senior UN official to lower his expectations" (88) . When Dallaire contacted the UN about Hutu intent to massacre Tutsis and
that Dallaire was "poised to raid Hutu arms caches, Annan ' s deputy forbade him to do
so" (89) . She records that on April 21 the UN Security Council voted to withdraw 90% of
the UN force (99), but blames this on U.S. diplomacy, not the concerted will of the Security Council. It seems unlikely that had the other Atlantic capitals, especially Ottawa,
Brussels, and Paris, really pushed for action and volunteered to support it that the U.S.
would have used its veto to prevent such an intervention .
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unwilling to forcibly intervene just a few hundred miles from
their own borders in Central Europe were even less likely to dispatch additional troops to Africa to halt an ethnic conflagration
rooted in centuries of animosity.

Africa and the Organization of Afric an Unity
Finally, it is conceivable that an individual African country or
coalition could have intervened in Rwanda. Interventions by individual states are not unknown in Africa as Tanzania, South Africa, Egypt and various other states have intervened across
borders in the past. Moreover, multi-lateral African interventions
did occur in West Africa in the 1990s (Sierra Leone, Liberia).
The obvious organ for cooperation among African governments
was the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In fact, since
1991 the OAU had a 55-person multi-national mission (Neutra l
Military Organization Group) monitoring the northern buffer
region between the RPF and the Rwandan military (Khadiaga la,
2001 ). Nonetheless, in 1994 the OAU had neither experience in
major military humanitarian intervention nor the political
mandate to do so. Indeed, as Ben Kioko (2003) argued in his
report about the creation of the African Union (AU) and the
demise of the OAU, the former was created partly in response to
the lack of response among African states in the crises of the
1990s.
Of course, it may be ludicrous to imagine that an organization
representing Africa's numerous despots would really have any
concern for Rwanda. Consequently, if the OAU was not to respond, were there individual African states that could have intervened? Rwanda's immediate neighbors are Burundi, Democratic
Republic of Congo (then Zaire), Tanzania, and Uganda. Tiny
Burundi cou ld not have acted: its president was killed in the
same plane crash that initiated the Rwanda conflict and Burundi
has its own troubled history of ethnic violence between Hutu and
TIIE JOURNAL
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Tutsi. That leaves Rwanda's three larger neighbors. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a similar history of violence
among its 200 ethnic groups, including Hutus and Tutsis.
Throughout the 1990s, DRC was unstable, ultimately descending
into its own civil war with the help of over a million Rwandese
refugees just a few years later. Uganda was not impartial-it
served as the staging area for the Tutsi-RPF, which ultimately
reconquered Rwanda in June 1994. Tanzania may have been in
the best position to intervene, but its forces were largely tied up
trying to provide security and manage hundreds of thousands of
refugees at its borders.
In the end, although countries like Nigeria and Tanzania
called on the UN to act, and even volunteered troops, none of
them intervened. In retrospect, no individual African state, no
coalition of Rwanda's neighbors, nor even the pan-African OAU
acted on behalf of individual human life in Rwanda. Indeed, it is
possible that the introduction of neighboring African forces
would have exacerbated tensions based on existing border,
cultural, and tribal cleavages.
WHAT WOULD IT HAVE TAKEN?

During the Rwanda genocide of 1994 the international
community acted only with words, resolutions, and newspaper
stories to stop the killing. The political milieu and the motives of
international players, including both Rwanda's neighbors and
major Western powers, were complicated by numerous factors.
The bottom line is that although some powers such as the U.S.,
European states (e.g. Belgium and France), and members of the
OAU had some capacity to act, they did not.
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Early Intervention
If someone had acted, what would it have taken to stop the
bloodshed? Volumes have been written on this, and the testimony
of eyewitnesses, as well as post hoc analyses, indicate that a
substantial number of human lives might have been saved had
military intervention occurred. General Dallaire has repeated on
numerous occasions that an UN force of 5,000 could have halted
the violence. 10 Alan Kuperman (2001) acknowledges that even
belated U.S. intervention in May would have saved 75,000100,000 lives. Gregory Stanton (2002) provides no clear number
of saved lives, but clearly suggests that hundreds of thousands
could have been saved had the West intervened. Likewise
Samantha Power (2002, 353), in her excoriating review of U.S.
policy toward Rwanda , suggests that countless lives could have
been saved and that early intervention was possible due to the
large number of forces on the ground and in the area (including
800 Belgians in Nairobi and 300 U.S. Marines in Burundi).
So, had early intervention occurred, when would it likely
have occurred and what would it have looked like? A vigorous
Belgian response to the loss of its troops guarding the Prime
Minister would have been justified after the third day of the
genocide (April 8). It is likely that Belgian action would have
brought other Atlantic powers , notably Canada and France, on
board, and provided the impetus needed for UN involvement.
Perhaps France, as a Security Council member, would have
pushed for greater UN involvement. We know that Belgium and
France had 1,000 troops on the ground by April 10 to evacuate
their foreign nationals. However, the Europeans retreated and
early intervention never occurred.

10

See Power (2002 , chpt. I 0).
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Late Intervention
It is unlikely that other states would have intervened in the
early weeks, as suggested in the preceding section of this essay.
A neighbor provides a case in point: in October 1993, Burundi
had experienced its own ethnic violence, with 50,000 dead and
no international intervention. It seems that most people in the
West believed, or chose to believe, that the April 1994 violence
in Rwanda was cyclical in nature and best defined as an ethnicbased civil war.
Neverthe less, assume for the sake of counterfactual that four
to six weeks into the genocide, outside powers decided to intervene. We do know that help could have arrived quickly. In the
past, such as the Congo operation in 1960 and UNEF II in the
Middle East, UN peacekeepers have begun deploying within
11
days of a Security Council decision to act. More recent deployments have also rapidly advanced, notably the UN effort in
East Timor and NATO action in Kosovo. Most telling, we know
that 1,000 European soldiers arrived within three days of the
outbreak of the Rwanda crisis to escort their nationals to safety.
Thus it is apparent that a rapid introduction of troops could have
taken place.
What would it have taken at the six-week mark, on May 18?
On May 17, the UN authorized UNAMIR TI to create and protect
safe havens. Had they arrived within the week, they would have
found 250,000-500,000 people already dead and the killing continuing. By this time the RPF had entered the fray and genocide
in parts of the country was happening as civil war was being
fought elsewhere. What wou ld it have taken to stop the violence
and restore order?

11

For detailed info1111ation
on the Congo intervention and UNEF 11,see the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations website at www.un.org/Depts/dpko.
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More drastic measures than a mere show of force by 5,000
blue helmets may have been called for. Instead, a strong intervention force, of as many as 10-15,000 troops would be
needed. 12 Intervening forces would need to have the authority to
dictate terms of security on the ground and be authorized with
robust rules of engagement. "Robust" rules of engagement are a
definitive mandate to intervene, perhaps based on Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, in ways that restore order, disarm the populace,
and protect intervening forces. 13 A clearly articulated set of rules
of engagement would include: curfews for all civilians the
disarmament of all non-combatants, search and seizure of
weapons caches, detainment of suspected genocidaires
(including the maintenance of prison facilities for thousands of
these individuals), the ability to not only shoot in self-defense
but to shoot to protect citizens in danger, a powerful border
presence to divert refugee flows and provide security for
refugees, and the like. 14 It is entirely possible that such an
intervention would have been castigated at the time as
paternalistic and heavy-handed.
In the end, such an intervention probably would have only
taken a week to stop the killing, but then the international work
of assisting in the reestablishment of governance and civil society would begin. The latter process would take, and is taking,

12
There is considerable debate over what number of troops would have been necessary to
intervene successfully after the first weeks of fighting . For more on this debate, see Kuperman (2001), Prunier (1995) and Caplan (1998).
13
Chapter VI peacekeeping is designed to maintain the peace at the request of belligerents . Chapter Vil peacekeeping authorizes the international community to act on behalf
of international peace and security . See '' UN Peace Operations : Applicable Norms and
the Application of Armed Conflict ," Air Force Law Review (Winter, 2001) .
14
Similar rules of engagement were used in Haiti in 2004. See " U.S. Rules of Engagement Shift in Haiti," 77ie Washington Post, 11 March 2004, p. A-01. For East Timor, see
"Australia 's 'Regional Sheriff Policy" in Asia Times, 3 July 1999; "Australian Peacekeeping Force Comes to East Timor, " in Los Angeles Ti11;es,21 September 1999.
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decades. Unfortunately , the international community would
likely have treated Rwanda in the way it has treated other wartorn societies: some international aid, but no real solutions to the
intractable issues of hatred and violence plaguing its society.
Such steps seem reasonable to many in hindsight due to the
incredible loss of human life. However, at the time, interventions
of this scale were almost unheard of- the last being the 19611964 intervention in the Congo which involved 20,000 UN personnel at its height. Moreover, in the early to mid- l 990s, no intervention had such vigorous rules of engagement. Even in
Europe's backyard , the former Yugoslavia, such rules of engagement were never employed. It was not until the late 1990s
that robust rules of engagement were utilized in Haiti and in East
Timar.
CONCLUSION

Rwanda was a bloodbath. A decade later most people seem to
take for granted that someone should and could have done
something to halt the violence there. This article has shown that
based on the track record of the past, it is almost impossible to
conceive of a rapid deployment of international forces to
intervene in the conflict. Recent studies suggest that this is
largely the "fault" of the U.S.; but the evidence suggests that if
there is blame to be appointed , it first goes to the killers on the
ground, those who armed them (e.g. France), and to those
governments who could have acted quickly but retreated instead
(Belgium, France, African states).
This article is not an exoneration of anyone for the killing in
Rwanda ; rather, it is a reality check on the current form the discussion has taken. The international community has a track record of rarely intervening in cases of civil wars and ethnic
violence. What shocks us in retrospect is that governments
around the world as well as the UN could have watched the
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genocide without forcible intervention to preserve human life.
However, Rwanda is unfortunately simply one of numerous
other cases from the 1990s where bloodshed occurred (Bosnia,
Congo, Sierra Leone , Sudan, etc .).
Several conclusions follow. First, the most likely interveners
were European and African states and they chose not to
intervene. Second , had they intervened it is likely that
intervention would have occurred after the scope of the violence
was truly apparent. Thus , it is unlikely that intervention would
have occurred in early April , but may have taken place in midMay, leaving as many as 500,000 already dead. Third , we like to
say that "s omething should have been done" but rarely like to
face what it should have looked like in actuality. In the mid1990s, there was simply no mandate for a powerful , decisive
intervention force in any conflict. What it would have taken is a
robust military presence employing force at times- this was not
to occur at Srbrenica nor was it going to occur in Kigali.
Fortunately , one lesson of the period seems to be that in some
cases of ethnic and political violence, the lead may be taken by
individual actors operating under decisive rules of engagement
with a mandate for peacemaking and peace enforcement. This is
what the U.S. did in Haiti, NATO did in Kosovo and what the
Australian-led force accomplished in East Timor. However, the
unfortunate reality is that it took Rwanda and Bosnia to shame
the international community into rethinking its practice of
peacekeeping .
Finally, almost none of the Rwanda literature , regardless of
how hysterical or hyperbolic its indictment of the U.S. and the
international community, discusse s the conditions for a durable
peace in the Great Lakes region. In the short run, a lasting
"peace " in Rwanda would likely entail (1) the complete domination of one ethnic group by another , (2) perpetual peace enforcement by outside actors, or (3) forced population transfers
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(e.g. make Rwanda Hutu and Burundi Tutsi). Again, these are the
political realities which are simply not talked about in the current
revisionist approaches to the tragedy. In the end, Rwanda was the
deliberate rejection of the notion of shared humanity by its citizens. We may never come to terms with this specific case of
genocide, but we can consider realistically what steps might be
taken to prevent similar horrors in the future.
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